Using Common Criteria Protection Profiles

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This presentation can be found at: http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/info/grs_ppsum.pdf (PDF)

http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/info/grs_ppsum.ppt (PowerPoint)



What is the Common Criteria (CC)?

- International standard
 - CC Project (US, Canada, France, UK, Netherlands, Germany)
 - ISO 15408
- Dictionary of security requirements
 - Like an ala carte menu (with "dietary" suggestions)
- Includes description of PP, ST, and TOE
 - PP: Protection Profile = statement of need
 - ST: Security Target = description of IT meeting the need
 - TOE: Target of Evaluation = actual IT matching the ST



CC compared to **TCSEC**

- TCSEC (Orange book) = hierarchy of requirement sets
 - 6 Classes: C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1
 - Each class is a specific set of requirements
 - Incorporates specific policies
- **CC** = menu of requirements
 - **PP** = a specific requirement set
 - Built from the "menu"
 - Equivalent to a TCSEC class
 - Written as needed, to fit user need



What is a Protection Profile (PP)?

- A statement of user need
 - What the user wants to accomplish
 - A primary audience: mission/business owner
 - Also used by users, developers, evaluators, and auditors
- A system design document
 - Refines need through several levels into specific requirements
- A consistent thread from 'what' to 'how'
 - Requirements match need in a manner the user can live with



Who 'owns' a PP?

- PP is fundamentally a statement of <u>user</u> need
- Ideally the 'using' community should own the PP and
 - Drive PP development
 - Soliciting input from developers, evaluators, auditors, and regulators
- User understands the mission/business and can state
 - what is expected of TOE
 - what is NOT expected of the TOE
- Others however ...
 - Vendors have a hard time stating what the product does NOT do
 - Security technical experts often fail to fully understand user needs



PP Outline

- INTRODUCTION
- TOE DESCRIPTION
- SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
- OBJECTIVES
- REQUIREMENTS
- RATIONALE



• Introduction

- Executive summary (what the owner of the money needs to see)
- Clear statement of the security problem to be addressed
- As far into the PP as many decision makers will ever go

• TOE Description

- Adds greater detail to introduction
- What is TOE and what is environment?
- Targeted toward the technical manager



- Security Environment
 - Address user concerns and facilitate requirement definition
 - Assumptions made in the development of this PP
 - Expectations on the environment that will not be addressed elsewhere
 - Expectations on the nature of the TOE (e.g., built from COTS)
 - Threats not covered due to explicit risk acceptance
 - Threats and organizational policies to be addressed
 - Those that are significant in terms of developing requirements
 - Those that PP users will want to see explicitly addressed
 - General level of assurance needed
 - Refinement of rest of PP to this point
 - Capture the gist of that is necessary to meet the PP goals



- Objectives
 - How policies and threats will be addressed in light of assumptions
 - Nature of the requirements needed
 - Degree of effectiveness expected
 - Focus for efforts (prevent, detect, react, recover)
 - Relationship of objective to policy or threat
 - One to one, One to many, Many to one
 - Explicit and derived (implicit)



- Requirements
 - Functions to be provided
 - Functions the TOE must provide
 - Functions the TOE's environment must provide
 - Especially other IT than the TOE (important for composability)
 - Functions the TOE and its environment provide together
 - Some leeway in precisely what the TOE does
 - Desire to allow for some flexibility in the TOE design
 - Assurances that must be provided
 - Assurance = Grounds for confidence
 - Assurance = IT quality from a security perspective
 - Evaluator (or auditor) measures using PP as the yardstick
 - <u>Ultimately assurance depends on the developer and operator</u>



Rationale

- Often packaged as a separate document
- Shows why the PP is complete, correct, and internally consistent



How is "conformance" with PP Determined?

- Formal CC Project Recognition
- Private sector evaluation and validation
- Private sector assessment and validation
- Independent evaluation
- Vendor assertion
- Other ...



PP Conformance (Continued)

- Formal CC Project Recognition
 - PP, ST, and TOE all evaluated
 - Nationally accredited laboratories
 - Use internationally agree to evaluation methodology
 - Subjected to national scheme oversight
 - PP against CC, ST against PP, TOE against ST
 - Evaluated items receive national validation certificate
- Private Sector Evaluation and Validation
 - PP, then ST and TOE evaluated
 - Sector accredited laboratories (can be the national labs)
 - Sector agree to evaluation methodology
 - Sector oversight
 - Sector issues validation certificate



PP Conformance (Continued)

- Private sector assessment and validation
 - Sector determined assessment performed
 - Perhaps audit verses evaluation
 - PP might not be independently assessed
 - Sector determined assessment methodology
 - Sector issues validation certificate
- Independent evaluation
 - Sponsor selected laboratory (can be national lab)
 - Use methodology agree to between sponsor and lab
- Vendor assertion
 - IT developer claims compliance



Example of 'PP' Use - CS2

- Use by Washington, Utah, and Minnesota
- Specify requirements for 'trustworthy IT' portion of Certificate Authorities (CA) validation
- Form of use: Private sector assessment and validation
 - States selected CS2 as the requirement set, determining it to be correct and useful
 - System audit conducted by commercial audit firm
 - Auditing firms, with state guidance, determine audit methodology and hence the precise meaning of 'CS2 compliance'
- CS2 can be found at: http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/pp/pplist.htm#CS2